The data secrecy of outsourced files in cloud server should be protected even though cloud servers are untrustworthy. In this paper, we extensively analyze the techniques on data privacy protection for secure cloud storage. We propose and compare several general paradigms on data secrecy protection including ID-based scheme, CLPKCbased scheme, key-escrow-based scheme, ID-based threshold decryption scheme, and trusted third party based scheme. After the analysis and comparison, ID-based threshold decryption scheme has the most advantages with respect to no constraints such as certificate and key escrow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud servers is increasingly deployed as a storage infrastructure to support novel ubiquitous computing applications such as Phone communications and Internet of Things [1] - [5] . It thanks to the blooming of portable devices that are equipped by wireless access capability. The marriage of mobile computing and cloud computing, called mobile cloud computing, thus fosters many novel applications that can take advantages of scalable storage resources and instant storage access. It is thus possible to cooperatively edit working files with remote users or pervasively access working files any-time and any-where. However, it also arises a critical problem: the data storage secrecy in intermediate cloud servers should be protected as a basic requirement for mobile users' privacy.
Mobile cloud computing confronts distinct challenges from general cloud computing systems, e.g., a large scale of customers, diverse client devices with various computing resources (usually limited), loosen trust between different services, asymmetric computational resources at clients and clouds. Hence, a tailored design is required to accommodate such characteristics [6] - [8] .
The goal of this paper is to propose and compare the techniques on data privacy for storage service in mobile cloud computing. The contributions in this paper are: 1)
We thoroughly explore the techniques for protecting data privacy in cloud storage; 2) We propose and analyze a family of novel data storage privacy schemes that are tailored design for mobile cloud computing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The network assumption, adversary model and design goal in Section II. Section III reviews preliminaries. Section IV presents proposed schemes. In Section V, we compare the performance and security of different schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Network Assumptions
Cloud computing mainly involves two entities: Clients and Clouds.
Definition 1: Clients (CLTs). They consist of a number of service consumers as a group who share files and/or edit files cooperatively.
Definition 2: Devices (DEVs). They consist of a number of digital equipments at CLTs that have various computational resource in terms of storage capacity, computational capability, and communication bandwidth. Definition 3: Clouds (CLDs). They consist of a number of service providers that have scalable computational resource such as storage capacity, computational ability, and communication bandwidth. Such resources may be consumed after payment.
Definition 4: Trusted Third Party Clouds (TTP-CLDs). They consist of a number of CLDs that are trusted by relevant CLTs who consumes services and CLDs who provides services.
n DEVs are denoted as DEV 1 , ..., DEV n . As mentioned before, DEVs may be diverse with distinct resources and ability in terms of computation, communication and storage. For example, DEV 1 is a PDA, DEV 2 is a laptop, DEV 3 is a smart phone. n CLDs are denoted as CLD 1 , ..., CLD n . CLD such as Google Doc and Microsoft Officelive usually provide cooperative document edition in its own domain. That is, CLTs cannot exchange documents amongst different CLDs. Hereby, we only discuss the scenarios that multiple CLTs share documents in the same CLD.
The brief procedures of documents sharing is as follows: An owner CLT creates a group and solicits other CLTs in the group to join via email. The invited CLTs make their decisions to accept the invitation or not. The document owner creates documents at CLDs or create documents at CLTs and upload to CLDs. The owner usually has "read" and "write" access privilege; The others in group have only "read" right. The owner can grant "write" to some others in the group.
B. Adversary Model
Based on our observation, the adversary model of cloud computing can be modeled as two main folders:
(I) ADV CLT . The adversary clients out of the group have curious on the shared documents and intend to inspect, modify, erase, or replace documents.
(II) ADV CLD . The service provider cloud has curious on the shared documents and intend to inspect them for their interests, e.g., for direct customer advertizement. It may also intend to conceal the fault that modify, erase, or replace documents.
As ADV CLT usually can be thwarted by access control mechanism at CLDs, ADV CLD is a major confronted adversary.
C. Design Goal
The design goal is to provide privacy protection for scalable data storage in cloud computing such as document sharing in presence of diverse accessing CLTs.
III. PROPOSED SCHEMES
A. Notation
We list major notation used in the remainder of the paper in Table I . 
B. Basic Setting
The first problem should be addressed is where to encrypt sharing documents, at CLDs or CLTs. As CLDs are assumed to be curious on the CLTs' documents, the encryption should be launched at the sides of CLTs (or TTP-CLDs).
Scenario I: One CLT. If only one CLT exits in the group, in other words, file owner is the only one accessing the file, the solution seems to be straightforward. The owner CLT generates the encryption symmetric key -K. The file is encrypted by K at the CLT and sends to the CLD to store. Upon file accessing, the encrypted file is fetched from the CLD and decrypted at the CLT. However, the feasible solution needs to consider following aspects:
1) It is required to accommodate the diverse devices. As the CLT may use different DEVs for accessing, the key generation function and encryption/decryption algorithm can be launched at a wide range of devices with respect to computing resources.
2) Encryption and decryption algorithm may be provided by TTP-CLD and is open to access and can be downloaded. The integrity of the encryption and decryption programs is protected by M AC value, which is computed by certain cryptographic hash functions such as SHA1 or MD5. M AC value is listed along with the programs or transmitted to other CLTs by email.
3) As CLT usually can only remember the password with limited length, to maximize the key space, we propose that the encryption key is partially fetched from the storage CLD and partially remembered by the CLT.
Scenario II: Multiple CLTs. If the group member is more than one, one naive method is thus file owner generates the encryption key and distributes the key to others off-line. But, it is not scalable when the number of group members becomes large, e.g., more than one thousand. We thus focus on the online key distribution scenarios.
As asymmetric key systems have longer encryption delay than symmetric key systems, in practices hybrid scheme is desired. That is, a symmetric key is randomly generated for encryption and public key is used for key transportation of encryption key. Based on such observation, a straightforward way thus is that an owner CLT generates a random secret key for encrypting documents and transfer such secret key to other group members after encrypted with corresponding public keys. Nonetheless, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is not available for personal usage in current cloud computing practices. Moreover, PKI induces a large overhead in key management such as certificate issuing, user revocation, and certificate verification. We thus concentrate on the public key system without certificate.
C. Scheme I: ID-PKC based Scheme
As data sharing invitation is always sent to group members by email, it implies that the email provider is assumed to be trusted. Cloud service provider itself usually is an email provider in current practices, e.g., Google Docs via Gmail, Microsoft Officelive via Hotmail. CLTs have to trust service provider in the end, otherwise they cannot employ the services. We argue that in this paradigm it is difficult to enhance extra data security. Therefore, we believe that the email provider should be distinct from the storage service provider.
We thus propose to use ID-base public key cryptography (ID-PKC), which is desirable in this situation because ID is already available -the email address. In ID-PKC, no certificate is required, as the public key is ID that is widely known. The cumbersomeness of certification management is surmounted. Trusted email provider hereby is a TTP-CLD, who performs as private key generating center (KGC). It generates the private key of users from user's ID -email address. Suppose a data owner CLT applies for the cloud storage from cloud provider CLD. The CLD returns the account information to the owner CLT via email. The basic steps of key transportation for secure storage services in cloud computing are as follows:
1) The owner CLT applies for their private key from the trusted email provider, denoted as TTP-CLD, by presenting their email address.
2) The TTP-CLD returns corresponding private key to the owner CLT. For the details of CLTs' private key generation, we utilize ID-PKC [9] as follows: i) Setup. Given a security parameter k ∈ Z + , the setup algorithm runs BDH parameter generator IG on input k to generate two groups G 1 , G 2 of order q, and an admissible bilinear map e :
Choose a random generator P ∈ G 1 . Pick a random s ∈ Z * q and set P pub = sP . Choose a cryptographic hash function
The system parameters are params =< q, G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 >. The master key is s ∈ Z * q . ii) Extract. Generate Alice's private key. Suppose her email address is ID ∈ {0, 1} * . The algorithm Extract computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) ∈ G * 1 , and sets Alice's private key d ID to be d ID = sQ ID where s is the master key.
3) The owner CLT generates a Random Group Key (RGK) and sends to other group members after encrypting it using other group member's (e.g., Alice's) public key. More specifically, suppose the public key (email address) of Alice is ID A . Owner CLT computes
We do not use the owner's private key, but we leave the flexibility to use ID based signature scheme.
4) The group members who receive the group invitation will request the TTP-CLD for their corresponding private keys by presenting their email address.
5) The group members receive their private key and decrypt out the RGK.
Note that, step 4) and 5) can be invoked independently without relevance to file sharing. The encryption/decryption software can be downloaded from the CLD just-in-time and install into web browser as a plugin component. The data confidentiality is protected by the encryption and decryption via distributed RGK. Figure 1 depicts the main ideas of ID-PKC based scheme. 
D. Scheme II: CL-PKC based Scheme
Although TTP-CLD is usually trusted thoroughly, the key escrow inevitably in ID-based PKC and is undesirable in certain situations such as pursuing mission-critical confidentiality. For example, suppose Alice wants to invite Bob to comment some contents in the document. The trusted email provider forges Alice to send a invitation email to Bob, and further impersonate Alice to generate a RGK and signed RGK by exploiting Alice's private key. Bob thus is misleaded to expose his comments into the document. Normally, such situation occurs very scarce because email providers usually have Service Level Agreement (SLA) with customers. It may suffer law sue for such behaviors. Nonetheless, such weakness can be trivially surmounted by adding a confirming handshaking off-line, e.g., Bob takes a phone call to Alice to confirm the invitation request, but of cause it is unscalable. To further tackle such weakness in ID-PKC based scheme, we propose a CL-PKC based scheme.
We employ a basic CL-PKC scheme from pairings [10] in the following. Similar to ID-PKC based scheme, Email provider performs as a TTP-CLD. In CL-PKC based scheme, it is also called KGC. Different with the ID-PKC based scheme, this KGC has no access to the private key of the CLTs, but can only access partial private key. Let k be a security parameter given to the Setup algorithm and IG algorithm (a BDH parameter generator) with input k. The major difference between CL-PKC based scheme and ID-PKC based scheme is that private keys are not generated at TTP-CLD, but at CLTs. First step 1) is the same. The detailed differences are as follows:
2) TTP-CLD runs Setup algorithm at first as follows: i) Run IG algorithm on input k to generate output < G 1 , G 2 , e > where G 1 and G 2 are groups of some prime order q and e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a pairing. ii) Choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G 1 . iii) Select a master key s uniformly at random from Z * q and set P 0 = sP . iv) Choose cryptographic hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * 1 and G 2 → 0, 1 n . Here n will be the bit-length of RGK.
The system parameters at TTP-CLD are params =< G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 ,
ii) TTP-CLD runs P artial−P rivate−Key−Extract algorithm, which takes as input a CLT (e.g., Alice)'s identifier ID A ∈ {0, 1} * (e.g., email address), and carries out the following steps to construct the partial private key for the CLT Alice: i) Compute
CLT Alice can verify the correctness of the P artial − P rivate − Key − Extract algorithm output by trivially checking e(D A , P ) = e(Q A , P 0 ).
3) Once CLT Alice is invited by the owner CLT, she runs Set − Secret − V alue algorithm, which takes as inputs params and CLT Alice's identity ID A as inputs.
It selects x A ∈ Z * q at random and outputs x A as Alice's secret value.
CLT Alice runs Set−P rivate−Key algorithm, which takes as inputs params, an Alice's partial key D A and Alice's secret value x A ∈ Z * q . It transforms partial private key D A to private key S A by computing S A = x A D A = x A sQ A ∈ G * 1 . CLT Alice runs Set − P ublic − Key algorithm, which takes params and Alice's secret value x A ∈ Z * q as inputs and constructs Alice's public key as
4) Owner CLT asks CLT Alice's Public Key along with the invitation email to Alice. Alice reply her public key P A =< X A , Y A > to Owner CLT. 5) Owner CLT encrypts RGK with Alice's public key P A =< X A , Y A >. It performs the following steps: i) Check that X A , Y A ∈ G * 1 and that the equality e(X A , P 0 ) = e(Y A , P ) holds or not. If not, Alice's pubic key is not authenticated and abort.
ii) Compute Q A = H 1 (ID A ) ∈ G * 1 . iii) Choose a random value r ∈ Z * q . iv) Compute and send the ciphertext C to CLT Alice. Here,
6) CLT Alice decrypts the C =< U, V > using the private key S A . Compute and obtain: A , U ) ).
E. Scheme III: Key Escrow Encryption based Scheme
In Scheme I and II, key is generated by owner CLT. The main security concern concentrates on the transportation of encryption key (RGK). As the RGK is generated and controlled solely by CLTs, it imposes forensics, accountable or traceable difficulties. That is, the encrypted file cannot be decrypted out in digital investigation and law enforcement. We thus suffer a dilemma. On one hand, the RGK should be confidential and key escrow problem of ID-based cryptography need to be avoided. On the other hand, the RGK can be recovered once required.
To tackle such problem, one possible way is the application of key escrow encryption system [11] . TTP-CLD can decrypt the encrypted data with the help of key escrow agent. Key escrow encryption system can be employed in secure cloud storage as follows:
1) Key Escrow Agent (KEA) may be acted by a public organization, government or administration agency. It holds Key Escrow Component (KEC) that store the Data Recovery Keys (DRK). DRK is a key to determine encryption key by taking Data Recovery Field (DRF) as a input. DRF may be a part of normal key distribution mechanism.
2) TTP-CLD holds the Data Recovery Component (DRC) that takes DRK and DRF as inputs to recovery the encryption key.
3) CLTs generate the encryption key and encrypt the data. The partial encrypted data perform as DRF when data decryption is required. Figure 2 depicts the key recovery encryption based scheme.
Figure 2. Key Escrow Encryption based Scheme
F. Scheme IV: Threshold Decryption based Scheme
Scheme III is usually suitable in the scenario that CLTs and KEA locates in the same law management domain. It is not convenient to use such scheme, if the CLTs in cloud computing is distributed in different domains. To still tackle the problem, we thus propose to use threshold decryption based scheme [12] . Threshold decryption service is a service when the decryption peers are more than the threshold, the decryption would be possible. In aforementioned schemes, we use ID-based cryptography as the ID -email address is available. We thus continue to explore the ID-based threshold decryption scheme.
In ID-based threshold decryption schemes, one method is using secret sharing [13] to share private keys. It induces a large number of key shares for each private key. The other one is using secret sharing to share the master key in multiple KGCs [9] . Our scheme takes advantages of the latter one.
1) CLTs generate the RGK and encrypt the sharing data.
2) KGC, usually a TTP-CLD, shares the master key with a law enforcement agency by using a (2,2) secret sharing scheme. That is, one party generates a random number SHR 1 and holds it. The other party holds value SHR 2 = M asterKey ⊕ R. Hence, only when two parties are available, the master key can be recovered, by SHR 1 ⊕ SHR 2 . TTP-CLD uses master key to generate and distribute the CLTs' private keys. After that, the master key is erased.
3) CLTs transport the encrypted RGK using others' public key (other CLTs's ID -email address). Received CLTs use their private keys to decrypt out RGK. Figure 3 depicts ID-based Threshold Decryption based Scheme. 
G. Scheme V: Outsourced TTP-CLD based Scheme
In previous schemes, the data is processed at local CLT's DEVs. In some situations, they may not possess enough computational resources to facilitate document edition. Also, the encryption and decryption are both performed at file owner CLT. The encryption and decryption programs are downloaded from service CLD and program integrity can be checked by public MAC value. If we assume TTP-CLD is fully trusted, we can outsource the data processing and encryption/ decryption to TTP-CLD for user's conveniences and also enjoy computational flexibility, TTP-CLD can provide extensive encryption/decryption options to CLTs, as well as key generation and management functions.
We list typical paradigms that can be employed in the TTP-CLD based scheme as follows.
Paradigm I: Implicit security service mode. The security enhancement on storage is implicit. CLT's data is encrypted and decrypted at a transparent TTP-CLD before it is stored at storage service CLD. CLTs ensure that the operation at TTP-CLD is automatically executed upon file reading and writing. The TTP-CLD service is invoked by storage service CLD. E.g., when CLTs upload the file, the popup window is redirected to TTP-CLD and the file is transformed to encrypted file. When CLTs access the file, the service CLD invokes TTP-CLD to decrypt the file.
Paradigm II: Implicit storage service mode.
The storage service itself is implicit. If the TTP-CLD has interfaces to the file sharing, the storage service can be invoked by TTP-CLD. It seems that the storage service is also provided by TTP-CLD (storage service CLD is transparent).
Paradigm III: Third party certificate and audit. Storage service CLD obtains its certificate on storage security from a TTP organization, and the TTP has responsibilities to ensure that the certificated service providers have maintained the data storage security for CLTs. They may checks the CLDs on-site for regulation compliance, such as HIPPA [14] and certificate achievement such as SAS No.70 [15] .
Paradigm IV: IDA based Scheme.
In previous schemes, the cryptographic encryption functions are utilized. Outsourced TTP-CLD does not utilize encryption but exploit Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [16] to achieve secure data storage. IDA algorithm divides data into multiple pieces, and enough of them can recover the data. The source data is encoded into redundant multiple pieces by matrix multiplication. The dispersing pieces are stored in distinct geographic locations which may be randomly selected by cloud storage provider. IDA is secure if the number of exposed pieces is less than a supposed threshold value, which can be selected when coding data into pieces. As the distributed storage locations cannot be compromised simultaneously to such threshold, the data cannot be revealed. Moreover, this approach can also improve the data storage dependability. For example, the distributed data may be erased or lost by mistakes, outrage, or disasters, but partial pieces can recover the source data if they are unaltered and the number is more than the threshold value. Figure 4 depicts ID-based Threshold Decryption based Scheme.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Performance Analysis
As PKI is not available for client users in cloud computing, we propose to use ID-PKC based scheme. To avoid the strong trust assumption of TTP-CLD in terms of key escrow, CL-PKC based scheme can enjoy the profits of both no certificate and no key escrow. In certain scenarios, the stored data is required to be revealed by law enforcement and digital investigation departments. The exclusive possession of encrypted key by clients is Figure 4 . IDA based Scheme at TTP-CLD undesirable, so we propose to employ key escrow encryption scheme if the service provider and clients are within the same legal domain. Otherwise, threshold decryption scheme would be appropriate for more situations. In our proposed ID-based threshold decryption scheme, TTP-CLD and law enforcement agency will share the master key in KGC by making use of secret sharing. Only when they both in presence, the master key can be recovered, as well as the client's encryption key.
As a compensation of previous schemes, if fully trusted TTP-CLD exists and can be acknowledged by CLTs, a third party certificate and audit paradigm can be exploited. CLTs are avoided to do any additional operations, but some service fee may be charged by third party. If encryption/decryption operations are further avoided, an IDA-based scheme is appropriate. Data is encoded into multiple redundant pieces and is dispersed to geographically distributed storage locations. It is a technique to support transparent secure cloud storage.
In the scheme I, II and IV, the encryption of RGK is launched at the CLT's various DEVs. We need to demonstrate the encryption delay is tolerable in wide range of DEVs. In encryption, the computational operations consist of two hash operations, one pairing operation, one ⊕ operation, and modular exponential operation.
The computationally intensive operation is pairing. According to the benchmark of PBC library [17], on a 1GHz Pentium III, fastest pairing is 11ms and short pairing is 31ms. According to MIRACL library benchmark [ [19] .
In outsourced schemes CLTs may be asked to pay for the rented services at trusted third party. It may be charged by service time in third party certificate and audit, or by data volume in IDA based scheme. The cost analysis is relied on corresponding economical model.
We summarize comparisons between different proposed schemes in Tab. II. As IDA-based scheme has no encryption/decryption, it is not included in the table.   TABLE II.  COMPARISONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROPOSED SCHEMES   Scheme Certificate
B. Security Analysis
The security of proposed schemes are extensively analyzed in corresponding papers. Hereby we compare the security concerns in different schemes.
As the data encryption key is generated by CLTs, the encryption key needs to be encrypted and transported to other group members. As the cloud computing is widely applied, ID-PKC based scheme and CL-PKC based scheme can accomplish such tasks.
The data encryption should be at client side in secure storage cloud when no trusted third party presents.
Proof: As the storage service cloud is assumed to be curious to the clent's data and trusted third party is not presented, clients have to encrypt the data at clients rather than at clouds.
The data encryption at clients should rely on symmetric key encryption and the encryption key should be transported to other clients.
Proof: As the storage data is usually with long length, the symmetric key encryption outperform the asymmetric key encryption. The encryption is launched at clients and the encryption key must be transported to other clients.
The data encryption key should be encrypted and transported to group members with certificateless public key scheme.
Proof: The public key is suitable for transporting encryption key because the public key can be used to encrypt the symmetric key. Nevertheless, due to the large scale of cloud computing, even if PKI for clients is available, the management of certificate induces significant overhead. The certificateless public key scheme is appropriate to avoid such overhead.
The proposed certificateless public key scheme should avoid key escrow problem and possess the ability of encryption key recovery for accountability.
Proof:
The key escrow problem should be avoided, otherwise TTP is assumed not to feign clients. The encryption key also needs to be recovered for digital investigation and law enforcement. The typical certificateless public key is ID-based public key system, but it imposes inherent key escrow problem. CL-PKC can avoid the key escrow problem and enjoy the advantages of no certificate, but the encryption key cannot be recovered and traceable. The key escrow encryption can recover the key, but it has the legal constraints. The threshold decryption scheme is the most appropriate one for accommodate all the tradeoff.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a family of schemes for data privacy in cloud storage. Tailored design is thoroughly explored in our presentation by making use of advanced cryptographic techniques, such as ID -PKC, CL-PKC, key escrow encryption, and threshold decryption. Outsourced scheme such as IDA based scheme is also proposed as an alternative for avoiding encryption and key management. We analyzed that the ID threshold decryption based scheme has the most advantages with respect to no constraints including certificate, key escrow, key recovery, and legal domain constraints. The performance and security for proposed schemes are analyzed extensively for justification of feasibility and soundness.
